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Abstract—Recently, the security of Internet of Things (IoT)
has been an issue of great concern. Physical layer security
methods can help IoT networks achieve information-theoretical
secrecy. Nevertheless, utilizing physical security methods, such
as artificial noise (AN) may cost extra power, which leads to
low secure energy efficiency. In this paper, the hybrid precoding
technique is employed to improve the secure energy efficiency
of the IoT network. A secure energy efficiency optimization
problem is formulated for the IoT network. Due to the non-
convexity of the problem and the feasible domain, the problem
is firstly transformed into a tractable suboptimal form. Then a
secure hybrid precoding energy efficient (SEEHP) algorithm is
proposed to tackle the problem. Numerical results indicate that
the proposed SEEHP algorithm achieves higher secure energy
efficiency compared with three existing physical layer security
algorithms, especially when the number of transmit antennas is
large.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, physical layer security,
hybrid precoding, secure energy efficiency, secrecy capacity
I. INTRODUCTION
The IoT has drawn great interests in both academic and
industrial areas. IoT is supposed to enable ubiquitous con-
nectivity among billions of physical objects, such as vehicles,
mobile phones, sensors, etc [1], [2]. IoT greatly promotes the
gathering and exchanging of information, which is believed to
bring a huge boost in productivity and act as a cornerstone in
the future intelligent society. In recent years, the large-scale
application of IoT is achieved with the rapid development of
wireless communication technology, cloud computing, inte-
grated circuits, etc [3].
Since IoT is widely adopted in transportation, medical
health, industrial and even military fields, the security of IoT
is greatly concerned [4], [5]. Specifically, messages baring
high values are transmitted among large amounts of IoT
devices. Any leakage of these sensitive messages due to
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eavesdropping may lead to unacceptable consequences. A
widely used method to prevent information eavesdropping is
cryptographic encryption [5]–[8]. However, the cryptographic
encryption method is based on the distribution and manage-
ment of the secret keys, which is too complex and power-
consuming in IoT networks [6], [7]. Because IoT networks
consist of large amounts of IoT devices with constrained
resources (e.g. energy, storage, computing), the easy adoption
and energy efficiency of the secure transmission method are
key requirements [8]. Additionally, with the further adoption
of quantum computing and other high performance computing
technologies, the secrecy level of the cryptographic encryption
method is also reduced, since the traditional cryptographic
method can be easily cracked with enough computing capabil-
ity [9], [10]. In this case, secure transmission methods, which
can be easily implemented in IoT networks and prevent the
message from ciphertext cracking, are urgently needed.
Different from traditional cryptographic methods, in recent
years, physical layer security has been proposed as a key-
less secure transmission method whose secrecy is guaranteed
by information theory [8], [11]–[13]. Exploiting the inherent
randomness of the physical transmission medium and the
difference between the legitimate channel and the wiretap
channel, information-theoretical secrecy is perfectly achieved
when the quality of the wiretap channel is lower than the
desired legitimate channel [11], [12]. In the pioneering works
by Wyner, the wiretap channel model and the secrecy capacity
are introduced when the eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded
version of the legitimate receiver’s channel [11]. The secrecy
capacity is the largest rate communicated between the source
and legitimate receiver with the eavesdropper knowing no
information of the messages. Then, Csiszar and Korner consid-
ered a more general scenario and studied the secrecy capacity
where the channel is not degraded [12]. Other authors extended
secrecy capacity investigation to Gaussian MIMO channels
[13], [14], and studied the impact of fading channels on the
secrecy capacity [15]. With physical layer security, secure
transmission is guaranteed without encryption or decryption
2computation at the IoT devices, which eliminates the risk of
cracking and makes IoT networks more energy efficient.
Among the existing researches on physical layer security,
utilizing multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) and artificial
noise (AN) technologies to improve the legitimate channel
capacity and degrade the wiretap channel has been studied
[16]–[22]. The authors in [16] investigate the secure limiting
performance of the massive MIMO system when the number
of antennas approaches infinity. For multi-user scenarios,
secure massive MIMO transmission with imperfect channel
state information (CSI) has been investigated [17]. In [18],
the secrecy outage performance for massive MIMO relaying
systems are studied with imperfect channel state information.
The authors in [19] uses AN to degrade the eavesdropper’s
channel when the transmitter and the relay are equipped
with multiple antennas. AN assisted secure massive MIMO in
Rician channels is studied in [20], where the secrecy outage is
defined and derived to study the impact of the eavesdropper’s
location. In [21], a thorough investigation and optimization
is proposed for AN assisted secure MIMO systems. Com-
bining AN and multi-cell multi-user MIMO systems under a
stochastic geometry framework, a comprehensive performance
analysis is provided in [22].
Nevertheless, transmitting AN and utilizing secure precod-
ing schemes may cost extra power. How to increase secrecy
capacity while maintaining low power consuming has drawn
people’s attention [23]–[26]. In this case, the secure energy
efficiency is defined as the secret bits transferred with unit
energy [23]. The secure energy efficiency is modelled as
a nonconvex optimization function and maximized by joint
source and relay power allocation in [23]. In [24], the authors
maximize the energy efficiency of the three-node MIMO
system with an eavesdropper subject to the secret rate and
transmit power constraints. An iterative algorithm with is
proposed to improve the secure energy efficiency. In [25],
the secure energy efficiency for the untrusted two-way re-
laying network is investigated and optimized. The nonconvex
optimization problem is tackled and the proposed algorithm
remarkably increases the secure energy efficiency yet at the
cost of secrecy sum rate loss. Utilizing AN and MIMO to
increase the secrecy capacity, energy-efficient resource allo-
cation in multiple-antenna wiretap channels is investigated
in [26]. The results show that AN does not always improve
the system secure energy efficiency, depending on the digital
signal processor used to compute the resource allocation.
As introduced above, various transmission strategies are
designed and investigated to improve the secrecy capacity and
energy efficiency with MIMO and AN. Meanwhile, hybrid
precoding has been recently proposed for MIMO systems
because of its low hardware complexity and high energy
efficiency [27]–[30]. In hybrid precoding schemes, the number
of radio frequency (RF) chains is less than the number of
antennas, which leads to tremendous hardware complexity
reduction and energy efficiency improvement, especially for
massive MIMO systems with a huge number of antennas. In
[27], based on a low-complexity channel estimation algorithm,
a hybrid precoding algorithm was proposed to achieve sub-
optimal performance in the single-user system. The authors in
[28] investigated a joint optimization problem of computation
and communication power for massive MIMO systems with
partially-connected RF chains. Considering the limited number
of RF chains and the phase-only constraint, a two stage
precoding scheme was proposed to exploit channel gains
provided by the spatial degrees of freedom in massive MIMO
systems [29]. To reduce the costs of RF chains at the base
station and improve the energy efficiency, the authors in [30]
firstly proposes an energy efficient hybrid precoding scheme
for massive MIMO systems.
However, to the best of our knowledge, it is still an open
issue to implement hybrid precoding MIMO in IoT networks
to improve the secure energy efficiency. So in this paper, con-
sidering the gateway controller of the IoT network equipped
with a hybrid precoding massive MIMO antenna array, the
secure energy efficiency optimization problem is investigated
in order to obtain both high secrecy capacity and low power
consumption. The contributions of this paper are as follows.
1) The secure energy efficiency optimization problem of
the gateway controller in the IoT network is formulated,
considering the transmit power of the information bear-
ing signal and the AN, as well as the power consumed by
the gateway controller hardware, such as the RF chains,
phase shifters and constant power consumption.
2) To tackle the non-convexity of the objective function
and the feasible domain, an RF and baseband precoding
scheme is designed and implemented to transform the
optimization problem into a more trackable suboptimal
form.
3) A secure energy efficiency hybrid precoding algorithm is
proposed to solve the transformed optimization problem.
Numerical results indicate that the proposed SEEHP
algorithm achieves the highest secure energy efficiency
and close secrecy capacity compared with other three
physical layer security algorithms when the maximum
transmit power is small. In addition, when the number of
antennas keeps increasing, the secure energy efficiency
performance advantage of the proposed SEEHP algo-
rithm strengthens.
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. In
Section II, the system model is introduced. The secure energy
efficiency optimization problem is formulated in Section III.
Section IV detailedly describes how the secure energy effi-
ciency optimization problem is transformed and solved with
the proposed SEEHP algorithm. Section V gives the numerical
results of the SEEHP algorithm compared with other three
physical layer security algorithms. Conclusions are drawn in
Section VI.
Notations: Bold upper (or lower) letters appear in the
following sections denote matrices (or column vectors). X ∈
CA×B denotes thatX is a matrix with A rows and B columns.
()H denotes the conjugate transpose. |()| denotes the absolute
value. ‖()‖ denotes the L-2 norm of a vector. ∼ is used to
denote the equality in a distribution.
⌢
X and
⌣
X denote the
upper and lower bound of the variable X , respectively. ()
+
is used to denote max {0, ()}.
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Fig. 1 System model.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider an IoT network in which a
gateway controller sends confidential messages to K single-
antenna actuators, as depicted in Fig. 1. The gateway controller
is equipped with a massive MIMO antenna array with NTx
antennas, NTx ≫ K . To reduce the hardware complexity
and energy consumption of the IoT network, the gateway
controller antenna array is assumed to be connected to NRF
radio frequency chains and simultaneously transmits K infor-
mation baring data streams, K < NRF < NTX. Meanwhile,
there exists an eavesdropper attempting to overhear the signal
transmitted from the gateway controller R to the kth actuator.
Assuming the eavesdropper is equipped with M antennas to
enhance the eavesdropping capability, M > NRF −K .
Denote s ∈ CK×1 as the baseband symbol vector transmit-
ted from the gateway controller to K actuators. In order to
degrade the overheard signal at the eavesdropper, the gateway
controller emits the AN n ∈ CNE×1 using the NE = NRF−K
remaining degrees of freedom offered by the NRF RF chains.
Without loss of generality, assume that the entries of s and
n are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian
random variables with zero mean and variance of 1. The
information baring signals and the AN are firstly processed
by the baseband digital precoders Bs ∈ CNRF×K and Bn ∈
CNRF×NE , respectively. Afterwards, they are up-converted to
the RF domain by the NRF RF chains and processed by the
RF analog precoders Fs ∈ CNTx×NRF and Fn ∈ CNTx×NRF via
phase shifters.
The downlink channels between the gateway controller and
the K actuators are assumed to be i.i.d. quasi-static flat
Rayleigh channels [16]–[18]. In this case, the channel only
involves the none-line-of-sight (NLoS) propagation without
any line-of-sight (LOS) components [18]. Further denote the
downlink channel between the gateway controller and the
kth actuator as hHk =
√
βkg
H
k ∈ C1×NTx , where βk and
gHk represent the path-loss and small-scale fading component
between the gateway controller and the actuator, respectively.
βk = κ/l
χ
k , where κ is the lognormal random variable with the
zero mean and the variance 9.2 dB, lk is the distance between
the BS and the kth actuator, and χ is the path loss exponent.
The downlink channel between the gateway controller and
the eavesdropper is similarly denoted as HHE =
√
βEG
H
E ∈
CM×NTx , where βE andG
H
E represent the path-loss and small-
scale fading component between the gateway controller and
the eavesdropper, respectively. βE = κ/l
χ
E , where lE is the
distance between the BS and the kth actuator. Based on the
assumption that the downlink channels are i.i.d. quasi-static
flat Rayleigh channels, the entries of the small-scale fading
vector gHk and the small-scale fading matrix G
H
E are all i.i.d.
complex Gaussian variables. Thus, the received signal at the
kth actuator is written as
yk = h
H
k FsBss+ h
H
k FnBnn+ wk, (1)
where wk is the additive white complex Gaussian noise with
zero-mean and variance σ2w .
The received signal at the eavesdropper is written as
yE = H
H
E FsBss+H
H
E FnBnn+wE, (2)
where wE ∈ CM×1 is the additive white complex Gaussian
noise vector whose entries follows i.i.d. complex Gaussian
distributions with zero-mean and variance σ2w. In this case,
the downlink signal power to the kth actuator is Pk =
‖Fsbs,ksk‖2 = ‖Fsbs,k‖2 and the total signal power is
K∑
k=1
‖Fsbs,k‖2, where bs,k is the kth column of Bs. The
power of the emitted AN is Pn = ‖FnBnn‖2 = ‖FnBn‖2.
Without loss of generality and similar to [31]–[33], the
gateway controller is assumed to have perfect knowledge of
all the channels to the actuators and the eavesdropper. The
assumption is practical when the eavesdropper is active in the
IoT network, which is very realistic if the eavesdropper plays
double roles, i.e. at one time as the legitimate nodes and at
another time as eavesdroppers. The authors have also noted
that there exist recent studies on imperfect channel knowledge
in physical layer secure transmission. In this case, we focus
on the scenario with perfect channel knowledge at the gateway
controller. The imperfect channel knowledge scenario will be
investigated in our future work.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Based on the pre-described system model, the received
SINR at the kth actuator is
γk =
hHk Fsbs,kb
H
s,kF
H
s hk
K∑
i=1,i6=k
hHk Fsbs,ib
H
s,iF
H
s hk + h
H
k FnBnB
H
n F
H
n hk + σ
2
w
.
(3)
The capacity of the kth actuator is then obtained by Ck =
log2 (1 + γk). Moreover, we assume the worst case for secure
IoT network that the eavesdropper is noiseless [34]. In this
case the received SINR at the eavesdropper achieves the upper
bound [34]
⌢
γE,k = b
H
s,kF
H
s HE
(
HHE FnBnB
H
n F
H
n HE
)−1
HHE Fsbs,k. (4)
4The upper bound of the capacity of the eavesdropper is then
obtained as
⌢
CE,k = log2
(
1 +
⌢
γE,k
)
. Furthermore, the lower
bound of the secrecy capacity of the kth AN is derived as
[14], [17]
⌣
C
sec
k =
[
Ck −
⌢
CE,k
]+
, (5)
where [x]+ = max {0, x}. Because the eavesdropper only
overhears the kth actuator, for other actuators the secrecy
capacity equals to the capacity, i.e. Csecl = Cl = log2 (1 + γl),
l 6= k. Thus, the upper bound of the overall secrecy capacity
considering all the actuators is derived as
⌣
C
sec
=
⌣
C
sec
k +
K∑
i=1,i6=k
Cl. The total power consumed by the gateway con-
troller is modeled as [24], [26], [30]
Ptotal =
1
α
(
K∑
k=1
Pk + Pn
)
+NRF (PRF +NTXPPS)+PC, (6)
where α is the efficiency of the power amplifier, and the term(
K∑
k=1
Pk + Pn
)
denotes the power consumed to transmit the
signals and AN. PRF and PPS denotes the power consumed
by each RF chain and each phase shifter, respectively. is the
constant power consumption at the gateway controller.
Based on the established secrecy capacity and power con-
sumption model, the lower bound of the secure energy effi-
ciency is expressed as
⌣
η =
W
(
⌣
C
sec
k +
K∑
i=1,i6=k
Cl
)
1
α
(
K∑
k=1
Pk + Pn
)
+NRF (PRF +NTXPPS) + PC
. (7)
In this paper, the goal is to maximize the secure energy
efficiency of the gateway controller in the downlink transmis-
sion when the transmit power is constrained, the minimum
secrecy capacity is required, and the hardware limitations
are considered. The maximization procedure is implemented
by optimization the gateway controller baseband precoding
matrices Bs and Bn, as well as the RF precoding matrices
Fs and Fn. The optimization problem is formulated as(
Fopts ,B
opt
s ,F
opt
n ,B
opt
n
)
= arg max
Fs,Bs,Fn,Bn
⌣
η
s. t.
K∑
k=1
Pk + Pn 6 Pmax
⌣
C
sec
> Csec0∣∣∣[Fs]i,j∣∣∣2 = ∣∣∣[Fn]i,j∣∣∣2 = 1NTX
, (8)
where Pmax is the maximum transmit power at the gateway
controller, Csec0 the minimum secrecy capacity required to
satisfy the quality of service (QoS) constraint. The constraint∣∣∣[Fs]i,j∣∣∣2 = ∣∣∣[Fn]i,j∣∣∣2 = 1NTX is due to that analog precoding
is implemented by phase shifters, which can only changes the
phases of the signals. Thus, the amplitudes of the entries of
the analog precoding matrices are constant and configured as
1
NTX
without loss of generality.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. RF precoding design
It is intractable to obtain the global optimal solution for the
optimization problem in (8) because of the non-convexity of
the objective function and the feasible domain. The coupling of
the precoding matrices makes it even more difficult to find the
optimized result. To tackle this problem, we seek to directly
design the RF and baseband precoders, then try to solve the
secure energy efficiency problem with a tractable form.
Firstly assume the analog RF preocders of AN and down-
link signals are identical, i.e. F = Fn = Fs [35]. When the
downlink signals and AN have identical RF precoders F, the
RF precoder utilizes the all the degrees of freedom provided
by the RF chains to enhance the actuator received signals and
eavesdropper received AN. In this case, the highest secrecy
capacity is achieved [35, Proposition 2]. Similar to [36],
further configure the RF precoder as
F =


1√
NTX
ejφi,j , for 1 6 j 6 K
1√
NTX
ejϕi,j , for K + 1 6 j 6 NRF
, (9)
where φi,j is the phase of the (i, j) th entry of the conjugate
transpose of the downlink channel matrix for K ANs, i.e. the
(i, j) th entry of the matrix H = [h1, ...,hk,...,hK ]. ϕi,j is
configured as a uniformly distributed variable within [0, 2pi ),
i.e. ϕi,j ∼ U [0, 2pi ). The configuration is based on the
assumption that the gateway controller has full knowledge of
the channels.
Combine the RF precoding matrix with the downlink chan-
nel matrices, then the equivalent downlink channel vectors and
matrices of the kth actuator, K actuators and the eavesdropper
are given by hHeq,k = h
H
k F, H
H
eq = H
H
eqF and H
H
eq,E = H
H
E F,
respectively.
The received SINR of the kth actuator in (3) is transformed
as
γk =
hHeq,kbs,kb
H
s,kheq,k
K∑
i=1,i6=k
hHeq,kbs,ib
H
s,iheq,k + h
H
eq,kBnB
H
n heq,k + σ
2
w
.
(10)
The upper-bound of the received SINR at the eavesdropper
in (4) is transformed as
⌢
γE,k = b
H
s,kHeq,E
(
HHeq,EBnB
H
n Heq,E
)−1
HHeq,Ebs,k. (11)
We further assume P ′C = NRF (PRF +NTXPPS) + PC, then
the lower-bound of the secure energy efficiency is rewritten as
5⌣
η =
W
[
K∑
i=1
log2 (1 + γk) −log2
(
1 +
⌢
γE,k
)]
1
α
(
K∑
k=1
Pk + Pn
)
+ P ′C
. (12)
B. Baseband precoding design
Assume the baseband precoder for the signals to K actuator
as zero precoding (ZF) precoders [35], [36], i.e.
Bs = Heq
(
HHeqHeq
)−1
D, (13)
Where D is the K × K diagonal normalization matrix,
whose kth diagonal entry is denoted as ζk. To ensure Pk =
‖Fbs,k‖2 with the configured RF precoding matrix in (10), it
is easy to derive ζk as [34][35]
ζk =
√
piPk
4
(NTx − 1). (14)
To suppress to received signal by eavesdropper while keep-
ing the signal received by actuator little degraded, the artificial
noise is aligned in the null space of the K actuators’ downlink
channel [20], [21]. The singular value decomposition (SVD)
of the actuators’ equivalent downlink channel is written as
HHeq = UΣV
H . (15)
where U ∈ CK×K consists of K left singular vectors,
Σ ∈ CK×NRF is the diagonal matrix which consists of K
singular values, and VH ∈ CNRF×NRF consists of NRF right
singular vectors. The last NRF−K columns of V corresponds
to zero singular values of HHeq . To ensure H
H
eqBn = 0, the
baseband precoding matrix for the AN to the eavesdropper is
then designed as
Bn = V (:,K + 1 : NRF) . (16)
C. Secure energy efficiency optimization
Substituting (13)-(16) into (10), the received SINR of the
kth actuator is derived as
γk =
ζ2k
σ2w
=
piPk
4σ2w
(NTx − 1) . (17)
The capacity of the kth actuator is then obtained as
Ck = log2
[
1 +
piPk
4σ2w
(NTx − 1)
]
. (18)
Based on the massive MIMO configurations, the upper-
bound of the capacity of the eavesdropper is derived as [37,
Theorem 2]
⌢
CE,k = log2
(
1 +
⌢
γE,k
)
≈ log2

1 +
M
K∑
k=1
Pk
Pn
(
1− M
NRF−K
)

 .
(19)
Substitute (18) and (19) into (8), the lower-bound of the
secure energy efficiency can be written as
⌣
η ≈ W
⌣
C
sec
(P, Pn)
Ptotal (P, Pn)
, (20a)
where, P = [P1, ..., Pk, ...PK ], and
⌣
C
sec
(P, Pn) = Cs (P)−
⌢
CE,k (P, Pn) , (20b)
Cs (P) =
K∑
i=1
log2
(
1 +
piPk (NTx − 1)
4σ2w
)
, (20c)
⌢
CE,k (P, Pn) = log2

1 +
M
K∑
k=1
Pk
KPn
(
1− M
NRF−K
)

 , (20d)
Ptotal (P, Pn) =
1
α
(
K∑
k=1
Pk + Pn
)
+ P ′C, (20e)
Then the secure energy efficiency optimization problem is
rewritten as
(
P opts , P
opt
n
)
= arg max
P, Pn
⌣
η ≈ W
⌣
C
sec
(P, Pn)
Ptotal (P, Pn)
s. t.
K∑
k=1
Pk + Pn 6 Pmax
⌣
C
sec
> Csec0
. (21)
Although only two constraints exist in (21), the objective
function and feasible domain in (21) are still non-convex. It is
still unable to directly solve the optimization problem with a
standard method. Noting that the objective function in (21) has
a fractional form, the optimization problem can be transformed
into a parameterized polynomial subtractive form:
(
Popt, P optn
)
= arg max
(P, Pn)∈Q

W⌣C
sec
(P, Pn)
−⌣ηPtotal (P, Pn)

 , (22a)
where
Q =
[
(P, Pn) :
⌣
C
sec
(P, Pn) > C
sec
0 ,
K∑
k=1
Pk + Pn 6 Pmax
]
.
(22b)
(22) is a parametric programming problem with parameter
⌣
η . According to Dinkelbach’s method [38], (22) can be solved
by iteratively solving the following problem:
(
P
opt
(i), P
opt
n,(i)
)
= arg max
(P, Pn)∈Q

W⌣C
sec
(P, Pn)
−⌣η (i)Ptotal (P, Pn)

 , (23)
6where
⌣
η (i) is the parameter at the ith iteration. An initial value
⌣
η (0) is preset at the beginning of the iteration. The optimized
transmit power P
opt
(i) and P
opt
n,(i) is obtained from solving (23).
Based on Dinkelbach’s method, the termination condition for
the iteration process is expressed as
∣∣∣∣W⌣Csec (Popt(i), P optn,(i))− ⌣η (i)Ptotal (Popt(i), P optn,(i))
∣∣∣∣ 6 υ, (24)
where υ is the convergence tolerance factor with υ > 0.
If (24) is satisfied, P
opt
(i) and P
opt
n,(i) are the optimal transmit
power for the secure EE optimization problem in (22) and
(21). Otherwise,
⌣
η (i+1) is calculated as follows for the next
iteration
⌣
η (i+1) =
W
⌣
C
sec (
P
opt
(i), P
opt
n,(i)
)
Ptotal
(
P
opt
(i), P
opt
n,(i)
) . (25)
The convergence of the above iteration process is proved in
[38]–[40]. For the limitation on the length of the paper, the
detailed proofs are neglected here.
However, directly solving (23) is still intractable because of
the non-convexity of the feasible domain Q. Then the penalty
function method [41], [42] is utilized to transform the feasible
domain and objective function in (23) into a more tractable
form:
[P (ωj) , Pn (ωj)]
= arg min
(P, Pn)∈Q′


⌣
η (i)Ptotal (P, Pn)−W
⌣
C
sec
(P, Pn)
+ωj
[
t+W
⌢
CE,k (P, Pn)
]


,
(26a)
where
Q′ =


(P, Pn) : C
sec
0 − Cs (P, Pn) 6 t,
−⌢CE,k (P, Pn) 6 t,
K∑
k=1
Pk + Pn 6 Pmax

 . (26b)
The problem in (26) is also iteratively solved. ωj is the
penalty factor at the jth step. The penalty factor begins with an
initial value ω0. t is an auxiliary variable. Based on the penalty
function method, iteratively solving (27) with an increas-
ing penalty factor is equivalent to solving the optimization
problem in (26). At the jth step of solving (26), the power
P (ωj) and Pn (ωj) are obtained. If either of the termination
conditions
ωj max
{
Csec0 −
⌣
C
sec
[P (ωj) , Pn (ωj)] , 0
}
6 ρ, (27a)
or
j > J (27b)
is satisfied, the iteration process stops. And the obtained power
P (ωj) and Pn (ωj) are the optimized power in (23), i.e.
P
opt
(i) = P (ωj)P
opt
n,(i) = Pn (ωj). ρ and J are the convergence
threshold and maximum iteration number in (27), respectively.
If neither condition is met, the iteration continues with updat-
ing the penalty factor ωj+1 = µωj , where µ is the iteration
increment factor with µ > 1. The convergence of the above
iteration process is guaranteed. For detailed verifications, the
readers can refer to [23], [42].
To further solve the minimization problem in (26), (26a) is
rewritten in the flowing form
[P (ωj) , Pn (ωj)]
= arg min
(P, Pn)∈Q′
{Γ1 (P, Pn, ωj)− Γ2 (P, Pn, ωj)},
(28a)
where
Γ1 (P, Pn, ωj) =
⌣
η (i)Ptotal (P, Pn)−WCs (P)+ωjt, (28b)
Γ2 (P, Pn, ωj) = −W (ωj + 1)
⌢
CE,k (P, Pn) , (28c)
Based on the expressions of Ptotal (P, Pn), Cs (P) and
Cn (P, Pn) in (6) and (21), it is easy to find that
Γ1 (P, Pn, ωj) is an affine function with respect to Pn when P
is fixed. And because of the assumption that the eavesdropper
is equipped with an enough number of antennas to ensure
M > NRF −K , Γ2 (P, Pn, ωj) is a convex function with re-
spect to Pn when P is fixed. When Pn is fixed, Γ1 (P, Pn, ωj)
and Γ2 (P, Pn, ωj) are convex functions with respect to P.
As a result, it can be concluded that the when either of Pn
or P is fixed, the optimization problem in (28) is a standard
difference of convex functions programming problem, i.e. the
DC programming problem [43]. The alternate search method
can be employed to iteratively solve (28). At each iteration
during the alternate search, only one of Pn or P is optimized
by the DC programming method while the other is fixed
[43]. To be specific, at the mth step of the alternate search,
P(m+1) (ωj) is obtained by the DC programming method with
the fixed P
(m)
n (ωj)
P(m+1) (ωj) = arg min
P∈Q′P


Γ1
[
P, P (m)n (ωj) , ωj
]
−Γ2
[
P, P (m)n (ωj) , ωj
]

 ,
(29a)
where
Q′
P
=


P : Csec0 − Cs
(
P, P (m)n (ωj)
)
6 t,
−⌢CE,k
(
P, P (m)n (ωj)
)
6 t,
K∑
k=1
Pk + P
(m)
n (ωj) 6 Pmax


. (29b)
Then P
(m+1)
n (ωj) is obtained by the DC programming
method with the fixed P(m+1) (ωj), i.e.
7P (m+1)n (ωj) = arg min
Pn∈Q′Pn


Γ1
[
P(m+1) (ωj) , Pn, ωj
]
−Γ2
[
P(m+1) (ωj) , Pn, ωj
]

 ,
(30a)
where
Q′Pn =


Pn : C
sec
0 − Cs
(
P(m+1) (ωj) , Pn
)
6 t,
−⌢CE,k
(
P(m+1) (ωj) , Pn
)
6 t,
K∑
k=1
P
(m+1)
k (ωj) + Pn 6 Pmax


. (30b)
Solving (29) and (30) with DC programing is quite straight-
forward [43], [44]. The detailed process is neglected in this
paper.
Denoting
Υm = Γ1
(
P
(m+1)
(i) , P
(m+1)
n,(i)
)
− Γ2
(
P
(m+1)
(i) , P
(m+1)
n,(i)
)
−
[
Γ1
(
P
(m)
(i) , P
(m)
n,(i)
)
− Γ2
(
P
(m)
(i) , P
(m)
n,(i)
)] ,
(31)
if either of the termination conditions |Υm| 6 ρ′ orm+1 > J ′
is satisfied at the end of the mth step of the alternate search,
the alternate search terminates. ρ′ and J ′ are the convergence
threshold and maximum iteration number for the iteration pro-
cess in (29) and (30), respectively. The optimization problems
in (28) and (26) are solved with P (ωj) = P
(m+1) (ωj) and
Pn (ωj) = P
(m+1)
n (ωj). The detailed verifications for the
convergence of the alternate search is given in [23], which
is not listed here.
According to the above derivations, secure energy efficiency
optimization problem in (21) is firstly transformed into a para-
metric programming problem (23) based on the Dinkelbach’s
method. Secondly, the penalty function method is employed to
further transform the problem into (26). Next, (26) is solved by
alternate searching with DC programming at every step. The
derivations for solving the secure EE problem is concluded
as the Secure Energy Efficient Hybrid Precoding (SEEHP)
algorithm, which is listed at the beginning of this page.
Three layers of iterations are contained in the SEEHP
algorithm. Since the convergence of each iteration is specified
above, the overall SEEHP terminates with a finite number of
iterations. Additionally, based on the hierarchical structure of
the SEEHP algorithm, the computational complexity of the
SEEHP algorithm is associated with the iteration number in
each layer, as well as the computational complexity of the DC
programming algorithm used to solve (29) and (30). According
to the proofs in [43], the computational complexity of using the
DC programming algorithm to solve (29) and (30) is expressed
by
∆ = Θ1O (1)min
{√
α1
ϑ1
ln
(
1
Ω
)
,
√
α1
Ω
}
+Θ2O (1)min
{√
α2
ϑ2
ln
(
1
Ω
)
,
√
α2
Ω
}, (32)
Fig. 2 The lower bound of the secure energy efficiency with
respect to the maximum transmit power.
where Ω is the DC programming convergence tolerance, Θ1
and Θ2 are the iteration numbers, α1 and α2 are the Lipschitz
constants, ϑ1 and ϑ2 are the convexity parameters for solving
(29) and (30), respectively. Further denote the iteration number
in each of the three layers as iυ , jρ and mρ′ , then the overall
computational complexity of the proposed SEEHP algorithm
is derived as
Ξ = iυjρmρ′∆. (33)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the numerical results of the proposed SEEHP
algorithm are illustrated, compared with the secure energy
efficient power allocation (SEEPA) algorithm, the secrecy
capacity maximization (SCM) algorithm and the hybrid pre-
coding secrecy capacity maximization (HYSCM) algorithm
[26], [44], [45]. The SEEPA algorithms aims to maximize
the secure energy efficiency with traditional MIMO gateway
controller scheme where the number of RF chains equals to
the number of transmit antennas [44]. The SCM and HYSCM
algorithms maximizes the secrecy capacity with traditional
MIMO and hybrid precoding MIMO framework, respectively
[26], [45]. The impacts of the maximum transmit power, the
required minimum secrecy capacity, the number of transmit
antennas and RF chains at the gateway controller, and the
number of the actuators on the secure energy efficiency and
secrecy capacity are presented. Without loss of generality, the
detailed default simulation parameters are listed in Table I
[16], [24]–[26], [30].
In Fig. 2, the proposed SEEHP algorithm is compared with
the SEEPA algorithm, the SARM algorithm and the SHP
algorithm. For each algorithm, numerical results show that the
lower bound of the secure energy efficiency firstly increases
with the increasing of the maximum transmit power. When the
maximum transmit power exceeds a given threshold, the secure
energy efficiency of the SEEHP, SEEPA and SHP algorithm
8Algorithm 1 Secure Energy Efficient Hybrid Precoding (SEEHP) algorithm.
Begin:
1) Preset i = 0, t, υ, ω0 > ω,
⌣
η (0) =
W
⌣
C
sec(
P
opt
(0)
,P
opt
n,(0)
)
Ptotal
(
P
opt
(0)
,P
opt
n,(0)
) ;
2) While
∣∣∣∣W⌣C
sec (
P
opt
(i), P
opt
n,(i)
)
− ⌣η (i)Ptotal
(
P
opt
(i), P
opt
n,(i)
)∣∣∣∣ 6 υ
3) preset j = 0, P (ω0) = P
opt
(i), Pn (ω0) = P
opt
n,(i);
4) While ωj max
{
Csec0 −
⌣
C
sec
[P (ωj) , Pn (ωj)] , 0
}
6 ρ or j 6 J
5) preset m = 0, P(0) (ωj) = P (ωj), P
(0)
n (ωj) = Pn (ωj);
6) While |Υm| 6 ρ′ or m+ 1 6 J ′
7) solve (30) with DC programming;
8) solve (31) with DC programming;
9) P (ωj) = P
(m+1) (ωj);
10) Pn (ωj) = P
(m+1)
n (ωj);
11) m = m+ 1;
12) End while
13) P
opt
(i) = P (ωj);
14) P
opt
n,(i) = Pn (ωj);
15) ωj+1 = µωj;
16) j = j + 1;
17) End while
18)
⌣
η (i+1) =
W
⌣
C
sec(
P
opt
(i)
,P
opt
n,(i)
)
Ptotal
(
P
opt
(i)
,P
opt
n,(i)
) ;
19) i = i+ 1
20) End while
21) Return Popt = Popt(i−1), P
opt
n = P
opt
n,(i−1),
⌣
η
opt
=
W
⌣
C
sec
(Popt,P optn )
Ptotal(Popt,P optn )
End Begin
TABLE I Simulation parameters of SEEHP algorithm
Parameter Value
The maximum transmit power Pmax -5 dBW
The minimum secrecy capacity Csec
0
3 bit/s/Hz
The number of transmit antennas at the gateway controller NTx 110
The number of receive antennas at the eavesdropper M 30
The number of RF chains NRF 50
The number of actuators K 40
Static power consumed at the gateway controller PC 15 W
Power consumed by each RF chain PRF 30 mW
Power consumed by each phase shifter PPS -30 dBm
Power amplifier efficiency α 0.38
White complex Gaussian noise power spectral density -174 dBm/Hz
Carrier frequency 28 GHz
Bandwidth W 20 MHz
Path loss exponent χ 4.6
eventually saturates. However, the secure energy efficiency of
the SARM algorithm starts to decrease when the maximum
transmit power keeps increasing. Compared with the other
three algorithms, the proposed SEEHP achieves the highest se-
cure energy efficiency due to the energy efficiency maximiza-
tion in Section III and the hybrid precoding massive MIMO at
the gateway controller. Because more power is consumed by
the traditional massive MIMO at the gateway controller and
the optimization objective is the secrecy capacity, the SARM
algorithm has the lowest energy efficiency. Meanwhile, the
SHP and SEEPA algorithms achieve close energy efficiency
performance. The simulation results in Fig. 2 reveals that the
hybrid precoding scheme significantly improves the secure
energy efficiency due to less power consumed at the gate-
way controller and the relevantly small capacity reduction.
Moreover, when the maximum transmit power exceeds a given
threshold, the secure energy efficiency stops rising and even
starts declining.
Fig. 3 illustrates the lower bound of the secrecy capacity
with respect to the maximum transmit power. The SEEPA,
SARM and SHP algorithms are also compared with the
proposed SEEHP algorithms. According to the numerical
9Fig. 3 The lower bound of the secrecy capacity with respect to the
maximum transmit power.
Fig. 4 The lower bound of the secure energy efficiency with
respect to the minimum secrecy capacity.
results, the lower bound of the secrecy capacity increases with
the increasing of the maximum transmit power. Because the
optimization objective of the SRAM algorithm is the secure
achievable, while the others’ are the secure energy efficiency,
the SRAM algorithm achieves the highest secrecy capacity
performance. The proposed SEEHP algorithm achieves close
performance compared with the SEEPA and SHP algorithms.
It can be seen in Fig. 3 that the capacity reduction due
to the hybrid precoding scheme is quite small, which also
explains why the proposed SEEHP algorithm achieves the
highest secure energy efficiency in Fig. 2.
The lower bound of the secure energy efficiency with
respect to the minimum secrecy capacity is shown in Fig.
4. When the minimum secrecy capacity increases, the secure
energy efficiency performance of the four simulated algorithms
deteriorates. This is because the larger minimum secrecy
Fig. 5 The lower bound of the secure energy efficiency with
respect to the number of transmit antennas.
capacity leads to higher outage probability that the achieved
secrecy capacity is less than the minimum secrecy capacity.
In this case, more transmit power is required to ensure
the achieved secrecy capacity is larger than the minimum
secrecy capacity, which overall results in lower secure energy
efficiency. Compared with the other three algorithms, the
proposed SEEHP algorithm achieves the highest secure energy
efficiency. It can be seen in Fig. 3 that the capacity reduction
due to the hybrid precoding scheme is quite small, which
also explains why the proposed SEEHP algorithm achieves
the highest secure energy efficiency in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 5, the secure energy efficiency performance is
shown with respect to the number of transmit antennas at the
gateway controller. The proposed SEEHP algorithm achieves
the highest secure energy efficiency, which also rises with
the increasing of the number of antennas. Meanwhile, when
the number of the antenna is small, the HPSCM algorithm
has the lowest energy efficiency. When the number of the
antenna is large, both the SEEHP and HPSCM algorithms
with hybrid precoding outperform the other two algorithms
with traditional MIMO. These results reveal that the increasing
of the number of antennas has little impact on the transmit
power of the SEEHP and HPSCM algorithms. Thus, exploiting
the extra degrees of freedom produced by more antennas and
with the transmit power barely increasing, the SEEHP and
HPSCM algorithms achieve continuously increasing secure
energy efficiency.
The lower bound of the secure energy efficiency with re-
spect to the number of RF chains is shown in Fig. 6. The secure
energy efficiency firstly rises then declines with the increasing
of the number of RF chains. This fact indicates that when the
number of RF chains is small, increasing the number of RF
chains contributes to improving the secure energy efficiency.
But when the number of RF chains is larger than a threshold,
the tremendous power consumed by the RF chains leads to the
decreasing of the secure energy efficiency. Comparing with
other algorithms, the proposed SEEHP algorithm achieves the
10
Fig. 6 The lower bound of the secure energy efficiency with
respect to the number of RF chains.
Fig. 7 The lower bound of the secure energy efficiency with
respect to the number of actuators.
highest secure energy efficiency performance. As an algorithm
with hybrid precoding scheme, the HPSCM achieves higher
performance than the SCM and SEEPA algorithms, especially
when the number of RF chains is smaller than 50 and larger
than 100.
In Fig. 7, the secure energy efficiency performance of the
proposed SEEHP algorithm is illustrated with respect to the
number of antennas at the eavesdropper. The secure energy
efficiency decreases with the increasing of the number of
actuators. When the number of actuators is larger than 50,
which is the number of RF chains, the secure energy efficiency
becomes quite small and gradually approaches 0. Meanwhile,
the larger number of antennas at the eavesdropper corresponds
to lower secure energy efficiency. This is due to that increasing
the number of antennas at the eavesdropper leads to the
increasing of the received SINR at the eavesdropper in (5),
which leads to the decreasing of the secrecy capacity and the
secure energy efficiency.
The above results from Fig.2 to Fig. 7 together reveal
the fact that for the IoT network with a massive MIMO
gateway controller, multiple actuators and an eavesdropper,
the secure energy efficiency can be significantly improved
by implementing hybrid precoding scheme and secure en-
ergy efficiency optimization. Moreover, with hybrid precoding
scheme, increasing the number of transmit antennas leads to
little impact on the transmit power. Then the secure energy
efficiency benefits from the increasing of the degrees of
freedom produced by more antennas with the transmit power
barely increases.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the SEEHP algorithm is proposed to improve
the secure energy efficiency of the IoT network gateway
controller with hybrid precoding massive MIMO. Considering
the power consumption by the transmitted signals and active
noise as well as the gateway controller hardware, the secure
energy efficiency optimization problem is formulated. Due to
the non-convexity of the problem and the feasible domain,
RF and baseband precoding schemes are then designed. The
problem then transforms into a suboptimal form with trans-
mit power of the signals and active noise to be optimized.
To further solve the transformed problem, the Dinkelbach’s
method, the penalty function method and the DC programming
method are utilized in a hierarchical structure, which in general
forms the SEEHP algorithm. Numerical results shows that the
proposed SEEHP algorithm achieves the highest secure energy
efficiency compared with other three physical layer security
algorithms. When the maximum transmit power is small, the
SEEHP algorithm achieves close secrecy capacity compared
with the other three algorithms. In addition, when the number
of antennas keeps increasing, the SEEHP algorithm achieves
much higher secure energy efficiency than the compared
algorithms. In the near future, the authors will try to investigate
and optimize the secure energy and spectral efficiency of the
IoT network with multiple eavesdroppers and imperfect CSI.
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